

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 317 447

SO 020 530

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TITLE Policy Inquiry and a Policy Science of Democracy.
PUB DATE 31 Aug 89
NOTE 26p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association and the Policy Studies Organization (Atlanta, GA, August 31, 1989).
PUB TYPE Speeches/Conference Papers (150) -- Information Analyses (070)
EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Action Research; Advocacy; Behaviorism; Citizen Participation; *Democracy; Democratic Values; Epistemology; Interaction; *Liberalism; Policy Formation; *Political Science; Research Needs; Research Opportunities; Social Action; *Social Attitudes; Social Behavior; *Social Change; *Social Science Research; Social Sciences
IDENTIFIERS Positivism

ABSTRACT

An examination of policy studies in the twentieth century shows that there has been a movement away from an earlier concern for a policy science of democracy. Traditionally, political scientists in the United States have wanted to do good, and for most of them, doing good has meant studying regimes and the state in order to promote liberal democracy. During the development of the policy studies movement, research focused on broad economic and social factors that were seen as prerequisites for democracy. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, political scientists concerned with policy science shifted their focus away from structures, institutions and norms, to the positivist and more behaviorist emphasis on the individual and the group. They turned away from comparative analysis, and instead concentrated on narrow and domestic issues, looking to other social sciences such as economics, sociology, and psychology for theoretical and methodological models. These trends detracted from the policy sciences and the promotion of liberal democracy. There is a need in the field of policy studies to reconceptualize the values around which much of its research and analysis revolves--equality, equity, political participation, efficiency, productivity, and rationality. There must be a return to a broader focus and a policy science of democracy, and epistemologies and methodologies must be clarified. Seventy-two references are listed. (AS)

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Paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Annual
Meeting and the Policy Studies Organization Conference, Atlanta, Georgia, August 31,
1989.

Policy Inquiry and a Policy Science of Democracy

Rita Mae Kelly

When Harold Lasswell (1951) wrote about the policy sciences in the 1950's, he was concerned with broad questions pertaining to the study of "fundamental and often neglected problems which arise in the adjustment of man in society" (p. 15), in promoting human dignity, and with developing a policy science of democracy. The social context and society's structural configurations were at the core of policy inquiry because policies had the potential to impact the political regime. In the 1980's policy analysts focus more on specific policies and tend to ask how policies affect particular values, such as equality, efficiency, productivity, and liberty. The Lasswellian emphasis on how policies reflect or pertain to particular forms of government and societal power configurations is less common. What prevails is policy analysis and evaluation of how well a policy or program maximizes a given norm or optimizes balancing several norms. The search for the prerequisites of democracy have been left to those who concern themselves more with disciplinary empirical theory than with the development of a policy science of democracy.

The purpose of this paper is to explore how trends in policy inquiry have been related to the effort to pursue a policy science of democracy. First, the components of a policy science of democracy will be briefly identified. Second, in the main body of the paper a review is given of how policy researchers, particularly those from the discipline of political science, have addressed these various components and what the relationship is between trends in the logic of policy inquiry and the components of a policy science of democracy. Third, some thoughts are presented on some dilemmas policy inquiry will need to address in order to continue a viable pursuit of a policy science of democracy in the 21st century.¹

Given that a policy science of democracy has the potential for being an all-encompassing overarching framework, this paper is clearly a cursory and selective overview. Indeed, no clarity exists as to whether one should discuss a policy science or policy sciences of democracy. It appears that many policy researchers in 1989 would prefer to drop the reference to democracy entirely and simply talk about "the policy sciences." Nonetheless, for the purposes of this paper I choose to dwell on the idea that some policy researchers earnestly seek to promote democratic political regimes and improved democratic societies by means of something called "policy science" and/or the "policy sciences." I limit the focus of this paper to trends in political science and to those aspects of political science that seem to bear significantly on the promotion, improvement, maintenance, and/or destruction of democracies and the policy studies movement. In other words, although such scholarly pursuits as the study of political philosophy, the constitution and legal matters, for example, clearly have relevance for democratic thought and practice, no reference will be made to these pursuits unless they are linked to the policy studies movement.

Components of a Policy Science of Democracy

The development of a policy science of democracy would seem to require several basic knowledge bases. Among these are the following: (a) an

understanding of democracy—its origins, meaning, nature, prerequisites, structure, scope, and limits—so as to identify where it is most or least amenable to productive change, construction, or destruction; (b) an understanding of how social science knowledge can and/or can not be used to influence the development, maintenance, or destruction of democracies; (c) an explicit theory of value (justice) so as to distinguish among good and bad policies, programs, and outcomes; (d) a methodology for constructing valid knowledge about political systems, policies, programs, and social change; and (e) a theory of practice about implementing a policy science of democracy. In this paper I will deal mostly with (a) an understanding of democracy and will discuss (b) to (e) together. (Structuring this paper in this way is not intended to indicate that the latter topics are less important; at this point it is a function of limitations of time, space, and the huge scope of the topic.)

In the twentieth century policy researchers have devoted considerable attention to each of these components. As Samuel P. Huntington (1988) has noted, political scientists have a tradition of wanting to do good, and for most political scientists doing good has meant promoting democracy. In fact, both political science and twentieth century policy inquiry developed within a conceptual framework that focused on a concern for promoting a particular kind of democracy--liberal democracy, one that requires free markets and certain societal characteristics. This focus explains much about the history of policy inquiry in the United States as well as the history of political science.

Understanding democracy

Harold Lasswell, one of the chief advocates of developing a policy science of democracy, was strongly grounded in the tradition of political philosophy that focused on the study of regimes or forms of government. In the tradition of Aristotle regime encompassed notions of culture, lifestyles, ways of life, Tocqueville's moeurs, as well as the formal and informal institutions of government, laws, policies, and political acts. Aristotle summed up the focus of concern in his Nicomachean Ethics (1181b 16-23):

...let us study what sorts of influence preserve and destroy states, what sorts preserve and destroy each particular kind of constitution, and what the causes are that make some states well administered and others not. Once we have studied this, we shall perhaps be more likely to see with a comprehensive view, which constitution is best, and how each must be ordered, and what laws and customs it must use to be at its best.

World War I, World War II, and the Cold War intensified the desire to increase our knowledge of a policy science of democracy. In the 1950s and early 1960s comparative studies, such as Seymour Lipset's (1960) Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, and Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's (1963) The Civic Culture, brought the analytic techniques of behaviorism to bear on these traditional themes. Lasswell (1951, pp. 14-15) himself placed policy inquiry into a broad perspective:

The policy frame of reference makes it necessary to take into account the entire context of significant events (past, present, and prospective) in which the scientist is living. This calls for the

use of speculative models of the world revolutionary process of the epoch, and puts the techniques of quantification in a respected though subordinate place.

The regime focus of traditional political science viewed political life and forms as the object of study, the chief dependent variable if you will. Policy outputs, outcomes, and governmental performance as instrumental means to social or normative ends were not a central part of that conceptual framework (Hofferbert, 1986). Indeed, it is only in recent times that attention has been given to analyzing how policies and particular policy patterns impact democratic institutions and citizenship. The initial concern of a policy science of democracy followed the tradition of political science and focused on the conditions and requisites for creating and maintaining a democratic regime. The topics of most concern encompassed economic, social, legal/constitutional, and cultural conditions.

One of the most prevalent and persistent themes in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s in political science and in the APSR related to a policy science of democracy is that exploring the link among economic structures, conditions, policies, and democracy. Whether one was a pluralist, an elitist, a Marxist, or some other structural analyst, it was assumed that particular types of economic and market conditions promoted particular political forms. In 1977, Charles Lindblom, known also for his views on incrementalism and policymaking, reformulated this connection by explicitly classifying (in Politics and Markets) polyarchies as the modal form for liberal democracies. Numerous articles in the APSR and the regional journals also focused on the impact particular economic power structures and policies have on, among other things, political stability (e.g., Rogowski, 1987; Ferejohn & Volgy, 1978), political extremism (McHale, 1978), political influence (Salamon & Siegfried, 1977), government growth (Garand, 1988), political parties (Hibbs, Jr., 1987), expansion of the public economy (Cameron, 1978), the structure of class conflict (Przeworski & Wallerstein, 1982), and on working-class politics (Lipset, 1983).

In the 1980s few political scientists or policy researchers devoted attention to the broader topic of the prerequisites of democracy whether economic or social a la Seymour Lipset (1960), Gabriel Almond & Sidney Verba (1963), or Charles Lindblom (1977). Richard Hofferbert (1987) is one of those who has. In his 57 nation study Hofferbert found that nations that consistently maintained a particular balance of expenditures between welfare and military/defense policies were more likely to be democratic than those who spent higher percentages of the Gross National Product on military/defense. Hofferbert's study highlights a major concern of those seeking to identify policy prerequisites of liberal democracies, that of the trade-off between guns and butter and class conflicts. The American Political Science Review in the 1980s regularly carried articles on these themes (e.g., Donke, Eichenberg, and Kelleher, 1983; Chan, 1988). Policy studies journals do not tend to publish this type of article.

Balancing of class interests and guns and butter trade-offs are broad perspectives in the tradition of attempting to identify basic prerequisites of democratic regimes. So are the efforts to link political cultures and attitudes toward rules of law with democratic processes and/or systems. Although both of these topics sound too broad for what most people in 1989 consider policy studies to be, two of the most noted political scientists and

leaders of these efforts, Aaron Wildavsky and Theodore Lowi, are both former presidents of the Policy Studies Organization and among the more noted in the policy field.

Although Wildavsky (1987) surrounds his cultural theory of preference formation with modern day jargon, his concerns relate back to those of regime supporters in the tradition of Aristotle, Toqueville, Weber, and Dewey. Those who pursue greater knowledge about how and what different cultures contribute to liberal democracies publish mostly in the APSR or the regional political science journals (e.g., see, Merelman, 1980; Scaff, 1987; Inglehart and Flanigan, 1987).

Lowi's (1979) concern for the relationship between a rule of law and democracy is a longstanding concern of traditional political philosophy and political science. His work contributed not only to extensive discussions about what structures, institutions and policies are needed to create and maintain a rule of law standard in democracies but also to explorations of the link among different types of policies, policy outcomes, particular policy values, and their impact on political behavior. Concern for these matters have continued in the 1980s (see, e.g., Bense, 1980; Zemans, 1983; Grady, 1984).

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s political scientists devoted considerable attention to exploring how democracy actually worked. During this period community power studies and what came to be known as "democratic revisionism" or "pluralism" were articulated (e.g., Dahl, 1961). The behaviorist and positivist methodology along with an interest in political psychology seemed to facilitate finding evidence to support the view that competing elites controlled each other rather than being controlled by the voters, and that the actual operations of the U.S. version of liberal democracy were not particularly participatory. Because the findings were not complimentary to ideal notions of a liberal democracy, political scientists found it helpful to stress that as scientists they were only searching for the facts about what sustained democracies, not advocating what they found. The fact-value distinction provided political and ideological protection.

This tradition of behavioralism has continued within the strand of political science that still emphasizes electoral and voting behavior and the sophisticated use of quantitative, empirical statistical analyses. From this perspective there is little if any direct connection between research on voting, the electoral system and processes, and policy inquiry, or advocacy of particular substantive policies. The contribution these scholars intend and probably can make to public policy is to identify plausible connections between voting behavior of the electorate and voting behavior of elected officials. They also contribute to a policy science of democracy by advancing knowledge about how particular political structures and mechanisms (e.g., single member districts, PACs, etc.), voting rights acts, and electoral procedures are connected to voter turnout, particular party and candidate victories, and prevailing liberal/conservative trends among decisionmakers. Although these political scientists labor in the vineyard of a policy science of democracy, few of them have any intention or desire to be considered part of the 1980s policy studies movement.

What is now considered "main stream" political science still stresses the components of a democratic system, constitutionalism, and assessment of how

well the political and electoral systems meet expected norms about democratic processes but typically with a narrower frame of reference than that of the regime à la Aristotle and Tocqueville. Indeed, some of the recent critiques of the integration of political philosophy with empirical political science and theory stem from the narrower focus of political science in the 1980's (Gunnell, 1988).

From the mid-1960's on, as the distance from World Wars I and II increased and the domestic problems of the U. S. Civil Rights and Women's Movements took center-stage, disciplinary focus on the prerequisites for democracy declined. Attention increasingly turned to domestic issues and to the values of responsiveness, efficiency, effectiveness, equality, procedural fairness, and fairness of distribution. These concerns along with the behaviorist emphasis on the individual and the group as key units of analysis drew attention away from the study of the state and regimes. As Lowi noted in 1970, these trends distracted scholars from a concern with structures and institutions, and norms, making it seem as though we had a "stateless polity." The focus on a policy science of democracy à la Lasswell gave way more fully to an exploration of the bases of human behavior, individual and group decisionmaking, and to a concern for policy outcomes. In the pursuit of these matters traditional political philosophy and political science in general could contribute less than it could to the study of regimes. Hence, those seeking a policy science turned elsewhere - some to economics, some to sociology and psychology. In the process the search for a policy science of democracy changed dramatically.

In the 1960's and 1970's political scientists concerned about policy science increasingly turned to domestic issues and to the other social sciences for theoretical and methodological guidance. Those interested in improving the rationality of decisionmaking typically latched onto the utility maximization norms and rational choice theory from economics with its emphasis on efficiency, optimization, cost-benefit analyses, and other analytic techniques. The appeal of economics stemmed not only from its apparent usefulness in assessing various policy options, programs, and outcomes but also from its assumption about human behavior -- that individuals are rational in an instrumental sense and have the capacity to control and manipulate key elements of the world. The movement to economics also fitted well with notions that a democracy needs to be based on consumer sovereignty (individual decisions) and relatively free markets. It also was compatible with Madisonian ideas about the pursuit of self-interest, factions, and liberal philosophy's emphasis on liberty. The 1960's stress on PPBS (Planning, Programming, Budgetary System) in the Pentagon and other "Great Society" programs reflected the dominance of economic thinking.

As part of the increasing domestic orientation in the 1960's and 1970's, an emphasis arose on removing impediments to full procedural democracy and to promoting greater substantive justice in the United States. A focus on policy performance, evaluation studies, actual policy making and policy outputs and outcomes became more prevalent, as did the logic of economic choice (cf. Mead 1985). Goals were measured in money, and alternatives were assessed in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and optimization. Much of this economic orientation became part of the policy studies movement in political science. Stuart Nagel (1984), one of the institutionalizers of this movement and founders of the Policy Studies Organization, clearly stresses optimization, attainment of particular norms, and a turn away from regime-

level analysis. Most evaluation studies also adapted economic and industrial metaphors in evaluation research assessing policies and program outcomes (House, 1983).

Throughout the 1970's and 1980's the policy studies journals were dominated by these conceptual frameworks. Donald Campbell (1971) and James Coleman (1972) were instrumental in linking the social sciences (economics, sociology, psychology, and political science in particular) to the notion of an experimenting society. This society would be scientific not in that it would be based on social science theory, but rather in that it would rely on scientific methods as its evolutionary mechanism. "The relation of the policy sciences to such a society is a relation in which social science theory plays a small and secondary part, but methods of the social sciences play a central part" (Coleman, 1972, p.2).

According to Coleman, policy researchers live in two worlds: one is their discipline and the other is the world of action. Their job was to translate between the two, realizing that action-oriented research has a different philosophical base than disciplinary research. The major properties distinguishing policy research from disciplinary research are its concern for timeliness, action, and the use of everyday language and concepts, the ever present involvement of special interests, conflict, and struggle over resources, and a need for redundancy rather than an economy of information.

Coleman's (1972) resolution of these differences were all methodologically and procedurally based. In contrast to Lasswell's (1951) call for more speculative models encompassing entire epochs, Coleman (1972) emphasized statistical models and research design. Moreover, "Models used as the basis for analysis should be relatively simple and robust under conditions of only partially-met assumptions" (p.5). He additionally specified the need to be concerned with policy variables that can be manipulated and to distinguish them from situational variables that may be causally related to outcomes but not manipulable. The general principle being stressed is: "For policy research, the ultimate product is not a 'contribution to existing knowledge' in the literature, but a social policy modified by the research results" (p. 6).

The broad scope of a policy science of democracy is much less evident in the 1970's and 1980s as is a concern for political structure, although attention still is paid to the politics of decisionmaking and implementation. And Gormley (1987), Hall (1987), and Miller (1988) have urged policy scientists in the 1980s to pay attention to institutional analysis and means of changing societal structures. Generally, however, in the policy studies field rational choice and optimal decisionmaking dominated over power, politics, and broader concerns over whether a particular policy or societal change had a positive or negative impact on the liberal democratic regime in general. In addition, a concern for individual units of analysis, for programs and target groups deflected attention from regimes, a much less accessible concept for empirical and statistical analysis. In this sense behavioralism and positivism contributed to the drift away from the earlier regime-oriented understanding of a policy science of democracy.

In the 1960s and 1970s an intense concern for promoting greater democracy did exist among numerous academics and professional scholars. This concern, for the most part, became translated into advocacy research and

efforts to increase citizen participation and to empower neighborhoods and the community (e.g., see Hallman, 1974; Kelly, 1977; Larson, 1978).

Advocacy research, which in the 1960's broke with the value-neutral ideology of positivism from within the behavioralist tradition, helped make us aware of the extent to which policy research had become a tool of specific interest groups. In the "War on Poverty" advocates for the poor countered established political and economic elites. Experts countered experts using similar methodologies. Through advocacy policy research policy debates become less one-sided. More views were represented and heard, but it is questionable whether basic changes in participatory democracy occurred (Fischer, 1989, p. 11). The policy experts doing advocacy research were more like "hired guns," or chivalrous knights defending the weak and the poor. Although such steps led to a more diverse debate among interest groups in a pluralistic society, it is questionable that advocacy research advanced the epistemological foundations of a policy science of democracy. A politics of expertise does not translate readily into participating democracy. The latter does indeed require promoting greater citizen participation. However, as Fisher (1989, p. 13) notes: "As became apparent to many activists in the middle 1970s and early 1980s, advocacy has merely been grafted onto a system of hierarchical interest group structures which tend themselves to be hierarchial (1989, p. 13) As Michels' 'Iron Law of Oligarchy' makes clear, the representation of a group by experts almost always leads to an elitism that impedes the possibility of authentic membership participation."

The community control movement and advocacy research helped lay bare an inherent dilemma in promoting increasing professionalization of policy analysis and the politics of expertise and simultaneously trying to promote a policy science of democracy. On the one hand, increasing reliance on a body of technical and professional knowledge increases a nation's potential capacity for problem-solving. Yet "Such optimism is substantially diminished by the growing recognition that professional decision making, regardless of how good the experts' intentions, does not always turn out to the client's best interests."

In the 1970's and early 1980's the policy-oriented researchers keeping a closer intellectual link with traditional policy science of democracy concerns were scholars such as Lowi (1964, 1972) who examined how the distribution, regulatory, or redistribution type of policy was related to various patterns of political conflict, and Dye (e.g., 1980) who examined political dynamics in several policy areas. Most policy researchers who paid any attention at all to pursuing a policy science of democracy, however, pursued the topic from a critical perspective, i.e., through evaluation research and assessment of the gap between particular norms (e.g., equality, access to voting, equal opportunity to higher education) and the performance of the political system. Viewed from David Easton's (1953) system perspective, attention had shifted from the prerequisites/input side of the political system to the output/outcome side. For example, articles focussing on such themes as developing market-models to explain variations in the 50 U.S. states' welfare medicine policy decisions (Barrilleaux & Miller, 1988) became more common, even in the American Political Science Review. Policy studies continued its very domestic focus with comparative analyses being proportionally few in number. Fewer and fewer doctoral programs required foreign languages and foreign area study, dropping these requirements in favor of statistics and courses in cognate social sciences. Dror's (1984) concern for educating

cross-culturally oriented, interdisciplinary policy scientists gave way to more narrowly focused, technically sophisticated substantive experts who as often as not were without training in political or other philosophy or even in the logic, structure, and practice of different forms of government.

Given the emphasis on performance, outputs and outcomes attention soon centered around the executive rather than legislative branches of government. As a result policy studies moved even further away from traditional political science concerns. By the late 1980s and at this PSO conference most scholars in the policy studies field no longer referred to a policy science of democracy but rather just to "the policy sciences."

Uses of Inquiry, Values, Methodology, and Democracy

In the early years of social science research more optimism than currently exists prevailed about how useful social science and policy research would be in supporting democracy and in solving problems in general. In the 1920s and 1930s such political scientists as Charles Merriam held the view that "Democracy,...is founded on an objective, knowledge-seeking scientific approach to living" (Nelkin, 1979:108). Science would "make the world safe for democracy" (Pupin, 1924:273). Embedded within this view of the importance of science to democracy are several critical philosophical assumptions about the positivistic nature of reality, values, and methodology. To cite Nelkin (1979:108):

These [proposals for a science court] and other proposals (for technical review boards, a Technological Magistrature, and even a new profession of Certified Public Scientist) follow from a set of pervasive assumptions about the role of scientific knowledge in public policy decisions—that facts can be separated from values; that knowledge can be distinguished from its application. Such proposals assume democracy to be rational state in which political problems are resolved by the orderly, problem-solving, positivist approach that is the essence of science itself.

From this perspective which still is held by many today science and democracy are readily compatible. Policy scientists advance democracy simply by doing their work well. They do not need to be concerned about political philosophy, political regimes, values, the vulnerability of representative government, or citizen participation. Their job is to pursue science, to solve problems, and to promote their expertise.

In the 1960s the attacks on the positivistic perspective became more insistent. The debates centered over the fact/value distinctions, over appropriate methodologies, over whether problems would be solved more quickly through discipline theory development or a more direct, applied approach.

In the 1960s and 1970s more systematic challenges to this perspective of how science impacts democracy were delivered. For example, Bachrach, 1967; Pateman, 1970; Pranger, 1968) noted that most of the assumptions of this positivistic approach to a policy science of democracy were really promoting a technocratic and bureaucratic elite and ignoring entirely the criteria of political equality, effective citizen participation, and enlightened representative government. Charles Lindblom (1977) pointed out that the

concepts of procedural democracy and popular sovereignty were grounded in a very different model of human society than that posited by the positivistic policy science one. The former model he labeled "social interaction"; the latter he labeled "intellectual cognition." The social interaction model assumes that no harmony of human needs exists and that policy preferences do not always have rational bases; nor are they constant. The intellectual cognition model assumes a harmony of human needs does exist and that an intellectual elite is the most capable of deciphering that harmony.

An important component of the division among policy-oriented political scientists on how democracy relates to policymaking and analysis is reflected in the exchange between Nick Henry (1984), who has spent most of his professional career dealing with public administration matters and being active in the American Society for Public Administration, and Elinor Ostrom (1985) who has devoted most of her professional life to political science (and its associations, having been president of the Midwest Political Science Association and Program Chair for an annual meeting of the American Political Science Association) and policy research (and its association, having been president of the Policy Studies Organization).

Henry (1984) presents the pessimistic view that U.S. politics are paralyzed, ineffective, inefficient, and that the U.S. government, "as a democratic maker and implementer of public policies, is designed to fail" (p. 29). He advocates giving the government more clout, facilitating it to identify "the public interest," and then to increase its powers to solve problems and to implement that public interest. He appears to have greater faith in experts, bureaucrats, and elected public officials than he has in citizens who, in his opinion, tend to organize into special interest groups. The solution to problems is not more participation and more "democracy" but rather more centralized power to solve problems defined by experts and government officials.

Ostrom (1985), on the other hand, stresses that in a democracy institutional arrangements are structured to facilitate problem-solving by individuals and groups. The government is supposed to be a back-up problem-solver and to be neutral, like a referee. The fallibility of public officials and experts concern her more than the government's inefficiencies and ineffectiveness. Like most of the policy researchers who have stayed more closely aligned with the discipline of political science, Ostrom relies more heavily on the power of citizens and institutional arrangements in a democracy to hold policymakers accountable than on professional expertise to solve problems and governmental power to implement the "right" solutions. She stresses the importance of facilitating the strength of citizen participation in the policy process as active voters who hold their representatives accountable. For example, Ostrom stresses that "Citizens participate in the policy process in two distinct ways:

First, citizens select representatives, monitor their performance, and evaluate the policy instruments they design by examining the patterns of consequences they produce.

Second, citizens directly produce "policy" by changing (or not changing) their behavior to conform with the preferred behavior encouraged or discouraged by policy instruments.

Citizens learn through experience about the effectiveness of various levels and types of coercion for solving particular types of problems.

If citizens observe officials who tend to pass legislation favoring special interests rather than facilitating the solving of general problems, citizens will desire to curtail the power of their officials.

Therefore,...Citizens, who have lived in a polity in which coercion for the benefit of special interests has increased, will become convinced that simple monitoring and changing of their officials will not bring adequate relief and will attempt to place restrictions on the actions that their officials can take.

As we approach the 1990's a movement exists to move the policy analyst/scientist further away from the role of being a handmaiden of power brokers, whether of the government, the "establishment," or an advocate for particular interest groups, to the role of being "a 'facilitator' of dialogue and empowerment." (Fischer, 1989, p.9; cf. de Leon, 1988) A major aspect of this new role is improving our understanding of participating democracy and of appropriate decision making processes, continuing a tradition of political science and policy research on the nature, effect, and limits of citizen participation (e.g., Caputo & Cole, 1974; Langton, 1978).

It was not until the 1970s that serious concern developed for assessing the utility of policy research, and then, as Carol Weiss (1978) noted, it still was generally assumed by most in the policy studies field that greater use meant better decisions, and by extension, an improved democracy because more problems would be solved.

In the last 15 years a more somber understanding of the role of policy knowledge has unfolded as the result of systematic research by a variety of scholars (e.g., Weiss, 1978; Weiss & Bucuvalas, 1980; Dunn, Hegedus, & Holzner, 1984; Lindblom & Cohen, 1979) and the publication of such journals as Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization. In spite of the relatively intense interest in defining and producing "useable knowledge," very few of the studies or papers directly concern themselves with the use of policy inquiry/knowledge to promote democracy. Undoubtedly the Lasswellian values of promoting human dignity and a policy science of democracy are implicit in much of this research, but one would have to read that assumption into most of this literature, for it is not explicitly there.

Exceptions to this latter generalization clearly exist. In 1979 Nelkin, for example, explored the relationship of scientific knowledge, public policy, and democracy. Orr and Hill (1978) were among those in the 1970s who articulated the concern that effective problem-solving, particularly of environmental and ecological problems, might well require highly centralized, authoritarian governments, thus reversing earlier concerns of the 1950s and 1960s of trying to identify policies to promote democracy and greater participation. In the 1980s, the sophistication of technical knowledge and its required use in environmental impact analyses have drawn more focused attention on the tension between the notions of popular sovereignty, decisionmaking by elected officials, and reliance on technical and scientific information (Baber, 1988). It is now more clearly recognized that the very use

of policy research can stifle citizen participation and democratic politics.

Science impact assessment on society has recently been offered as a means of assessing the linkage between policy inquiry and public policy (Dunn, Hegedua, and Holzner, 1988). It is too soon to tell how this development will influence either the policy sciences or a policy science of democracy.

Since the 1960s and the community power movements, a continuing, if fluctuating debate, has existed over the extent to which policy research can and should be used to empower and serve citizens rather than bureaucrats or elected officials. As noted earlier, in the 1960s and 1970s this concern flourished under the rubric of "advocacy research." In the 1980s the push was more for "participatory policy analysis." In both instances a common theme was to do research in such ways and on such topics so as to enhance the knowledge and thereby the power base of citizens, both as individuals and in groups. As de Leon (1988, p. 3) articulates one of its current modes,

This (participatory policy analysis) is a methodological proposal which would expand the range of actors (in the policy patois, "stakeholders") involved in the making and execution of public policy in a discursive or deliberative mode. Succinctly, it would require the inclusion of a greater representation of those who effect and are affected by a given policy or, on a more concrete basis, program. The actual mechanism would be through an extended series of public fora with proscribed rules of evidence and argumentation....it implies a more horizontal than hierarchical policymaking process, one more democratic than administrative in nature, and one in which policy and process must consonantly reinforce one another....a fundamental working assumption of participatory policy analysis is that values must be explicitly and overtly incorporated into policy designs. (p. 4)

De Leon hopes participatory policy analysis will be able to address the anti- or undemocratic effects on policy studies from operations research, systems analysis, and economics (1988, p. 5). He thinks an emphasis on participatory analysis will particularly facilitate negating the negative effects of an elite corp of policy analysts, the technocratic elite, who is the handmaiden of the "establishment," "beholding principally to a funding client and largely insulated from the ultimate recipients of their designed programs (e.g., the homeless, the student, the medically indigent, the foot soldier). Another positive effect according to de Leon would be that greater citizen involvement would force the consideration of a wider range of values than efficiency, effectiveness, and rationality.

De Leon is careful to distinguish participatory policy analysis from efforts to empower citizens to take control of decisionmaking. "Therefore, the question is not one of more power to the people; it is one of greater access to and visibility in the halls of power....In short, participatory policy analysis should not be confused with participatory policymaking (1988, p. 14). In order not to interrupt the policymaking process and delay it unduly, de Leon also suggests that the participatory policy analysis occur during the policy formulation stage and at points where likely effects of implementing policies are being assessed (p. 15).

De Leon's defense of participatory policy analysis reflects a broad

concern held by numerous other scholars as well who seek an explicit return to a policy science of democracy rather than focus on a general policy science. Alice Rivlin (1973), for example, has proposed a forensic social science. Advocates of focusing on all the stakeholders in evaluation research also typically seek ways of using policy and evaluation research to enhance the power position of citizens and clients. Frank Fischer (1989) also advocates a participatory policy framework, but he more explicitly desires to empower citizens.

This brief overview of how policy inquiry and the concern for a policy science of democracy have been related in the twentieth century reveal some general patterns: (a) although the concern for a policy science of democracy was a driving force in the development of the policy studies movement, in 1989 it is no longer a central focus of concern for most policy scholars; (b) very few policy researchers are concerned at all with notions of regimes and political philosophy, although conferences such as this Policy Studies Organization one encourage such concern; (c) those who are concerned about a policy science of democracy in the 1980s tend to be concerned primarily about how to improve participation of individuals and groups with little attention as to how such participation will affect the nature of the existing regime itself; (d) even those who are concerned about increasing citizen participation, such as de Leon, attempt to limit the parameters of that participation so as not to harm the efficiency, effectiveness, and rationality of the problem-solving process; and (e) both the narrowness of the current value focus and the reliance on individuals and groups as key units of analysis severely impact how a policy science of democracy can be conceived.

In my opinion, these trends do not bode well for either the policy sciences or the U.S. liberal democracy. Policy inquiry can never operate in a vacuum. It is not like "art for art's sake." Presumably policy studies are conducted because they have utility, advancing truth, knowledge, societal well-being, justice, democracy. In the last three decades developments in the U.S. political system itself, particularly the inclusion of women as political participants, and changing understandings of the nature of reality and the logic of inquiry have laid bare several dilemmas that future attempts to develop a policy science of democracy must address. Although the dilemmas discussed below are selective, they highlight the basic nature of some of the challenges we face.

Basic Dilemmas to be Addressed

As the 21st century approaches policy studies needs to address a series of challenges comparable to those facing our society and the social sciences. From a societal perspective, we need to come to terms with the contradictions of liberalism and the incompatibilities of sexism and racism with a liberal democratic policy. From a social science perspective we need to resolve how we can develop useful knowledge and procedures that are reliable, valid, accountable policy analysis in a post-positivist post modern world.

These challenges are interrelated, for liberalism and positivism, and the U.S. capitalistic democracy, stem from the same philosophic traditions. The coming asunder of one strand of this tradition stimulates the unraveling of the other. I will begin with some of the key challenges to liberalism, limiting myself primarily to the impact of the women's movement with some minor references to the impact of the Civil Rights Movement. I will then move

to highlight some of the central epistemological and methodological challenges.

Challenges To Liberalism

Liberalism is dedicated to individualism, freedom from state interference into private matters, to the liberal rights that promote freedom of self-image, life-style, and behavior. The liberal value of equality of opportunity, freedom of expression, and tolerance have served a nation of immigrants well, enabling diverse ethnic and nationality groups to pursue life, liberty, and happiness as each saw fit to do.

In the last half of the 20th century both the Women's Movement and the Civil Rights Movement used the rhetoric of liberalism to try to change the status and position of women and blacks. The intent was, in essence, to change the popular saying signifying a free citizen from "He's white, male, and 21 (and therefore ought to be free to do as he pleases)" to "That person is a human being, over 18, and therefore ought to be free to do as he or she pleases."

The equal opportunity and affirmative action laws of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s made substantial progress toward eliminating barriers in access to jobs, schools, and public participation. This very progress, however, has laid bare several dilemmas.

One dilemma involves the dualistic separation of society into private and public realms. As Eisenstein (1981, 344) has stressed, the rights of liberal democracies have been grounded and structured on the differences between men and women. The liberal rights of men in the public sphere rested on the exclusion of women, on the political, economic, and legal inequality of the sexes. In the 1980s we learned that the claim of women to the same liberal rights "offers a threat to the fabric of interdependence on which men's rights depend" (p. 344).

Efforts to simply add women to the political and economic systems and stir have not been successful. For women to be treated the same as men—for one woman to be added to one man, and to come up with two equal citizens, two equal soldiers, two equal employees—has not been so simple as adding the abstract numbers of one plus one. For women to be equal the dependence of men on women for their bodily care, their food preparation, and the production and care of the next generation needs to be eliminated—at least severely reduced.

The private realm of home life, in other words, needs dramatic adjusting. Changes need to be made in homework, childcare, cooking, eating, emotional support work, and general social interaction. In order for women to become free and equal, the dilemma of the public/private split, and the preference for governmental noninterference in the private realm, except to control the sexuality and reproductive choices of women, needs to be addressed. The link between liberal democracy and patriarchy needs to be broken.

For policy studies to maintain credibility in the next decade policy analysts/scientists will need to explore and help resolve this liberal dilemma. The task involves not just setting goals and designing programs and policies using tools of the past. The task requires exploring in new ways the interrelationship of private and public space and the linkage of private space

with a democratic society. Assuming we want to maintain a liberal understanding of private space because of its contribution to creativity, freedom, and personal peace, we need to identify policies and programs that can be designed to keep a private space, yet promote equality for both sexes.

The private realm has been the main arena where caring for people has taken place, where supports have been developed and maintained to enable people, mostly boys and men, to act and to achieve in the public realm. A major issue facing the field of policy studies, is, can we assist in designing a caring society that will facilitate giving all an equal opportunity to act? We cannot contribute to this effort unless we once again pay attention to broad questions of political regimes. Focusing on equality only leads to readily to accepting an assimilation model whereby women must become like men in the public realms of life and men do not need to change at all in the private life. A democracy that requires all women to become "superwomen" to be equal is hardly procedurally fair or substantively just.

A second dilemma, related to the first, involves the vexatious situation of having an empirical reality of highly diverse individuals living in varied contexts coupled with a political philosophy and analytic tradition that asserts individuals have no context. Philosophically, the liberal individual is a person without context--an individual with rights but without sex, race, age, or disabilities. The ideal liberal society is color-blind and sex-blind. The liberal society is supposed to preclude the need for state intervention to facilitate "positive liberty." But this image of the disembodied liberal individual has not proven to be of durable help to women (or blacks) seeking equality and freedom.

The classification or naming of groups is a primary means of excluding people from being active participants in the polity and from being considered eligible for the "Equality Game." By naming and classifying groups in certain ways we can switch to an "Equity Game" where equals will be treated equally and unequals will be treated unequally. Women and men have been treated unequally. Women and men have been treated unequally throughout most of the history of the U.S. because biological sex differences solicited separate classification, and marital family ties enabled males to be designated as the legal, political representatives of women within the unitary social unit of the family.

But women are not the only group that have been victimized by the classification process. Policy analysts, program designers, and social scientists in general have utilized elaborate classification systems for racial and ethnic groups as well that often determine the allocation of public resources--that determine who gets what when, where, and how. For example, the racial categories of white and black are empirically inaccurate. Causians are more beige (or a pinkish brown than white). Individuals with 1/32 of their heritage from a negroid parent could be physically more white than a Caucasian. The category of non-white signifies not being part of the white group. These ways of naming individuals has become most important for access to employment, housing, and a variety of other valued goods disbursed by governmental funds.

Empirical reality and the analysts/policy scientists working world often in fact contradict each other just as the liberal notion of the disembodied individuals is belied in reality. In this next decade policy studies will

need to cope with this dilemma of our liberal heritage by recognizing that our categories of analysis are not constant, unchanging entities, but rather are socially constructed meanings reflecting time- and situation-bound sexual and social relationships.

In the process of resolving these dilemma we will also need to pay attention to how our naming processes, our policies and program designs have created particular roles of political participation. Since World War II, governmental policies have created new types of consumer/client roles. While some roles, such as being a client of the U.S. Postal Service are universal, many others are not. Many are tailor-made to fit our previously categorized groups and encourage political participation as a consumer/client. Participation as a voter or political activist in the electoral/legislative process becomes less valued and less related to personal interests and to societal factions. By paying attention to how policy affects participation policy analysts might be able to encourage more civic-oriented participation through the roles they define and create for each target population--part of our citizenry. Again some attention to how policy design is related to regime maintenance and change is needed.

A third dilemma facing liberalism and also policy studies is that a contradiction exists in trying to promote equality for a group when a substantial portion of it or of society might not wish such equality. In the case of women this dilemma is of some consequence. The liberal ideals of tolerance and of the freedom to pursue life, liberty, and happiness as each person sees fit are not compatible with the notion of enforcing sexual equality. Some women and men appear to prefer a patriarchal society. How can some women be free and equal while others are not. Do we force all to be free in some Rousseauian fashion? Do we force all to be subordinate or exclude them as has been the case in the past? Or, do we devise new institutions and new ways of addressing these old problems. Hopefully future policy analysts/scientists will be able to provide viable options for these dilemmas. We must contribute to developing policies that will structure political institutions and relations so as to ensure that neither institutions nor laws privilege only half the species while subordinating the other half. By being more aware of the need for a policy science of democracy we can collectively address our responsibility to prevent tyranny of entrenched groups, at least not to contribute to its perpetuation.

As time marches into the 21st century policy studies as a field will need to reconceptualize how we understand equality, equity, and political participation, major values around which much of our research and analysis has revolved. Liberal democracy in the U.S. has implicitly assumed that developing policies to assimilate women and minorities into traditional white male roles would suffice to fulfill the American democratic dream. In 1989 we know this assumption is false. Assimilation into a universal role or unisex citizenship is a naive approach that leaves us all tattered, torn, and more exhausted than invigorated.

Developing Reliable, Useful Knowledge

Just as the major values of equality, equity, and participation need to be readdressed in the future so also will the values of efficiency, productivity, and rationality need to be re-examined--and probably reinterpreted. The move away from positivism and the developing consensus

that we live in a socially constructed reality poses sharp challenges to the rational actor model of decisionmaking and raises questions about the utility as well as accuracy of linear, instrumentalist, deterministic policy studies.

With this analytic tradition effectiveness can be objectively defined and decision making can be readily improved by using standard statistical models to reduce uncertainty. The task of the analyst is to clarify categories of analysis, identify appropriate ways of measuring and manipulating variable, and use whatever weapons available to reduce chance and to increase control over the environment, nature, or the problem in general.

Within the positivist tradition an instrumentalist, optimistic, functional approach prevailed. Within this tradition policy analysts generally assumed that given enough time, resources, and information, a rational actor/analyst/scientist would be able to discover solutions to problems. This approach rested on the belief that organizations, environments, products, processes, and individuals are concrete, objective entities. An objectively defined social world permitted reliance on instrumental logic. Planning by experts is possible in this framework because time is unchanging and variables can be held constant enough so that linear testing and linear prediction models seem valid. The universality, consistency, and stability of our variables—these objective entities separate from us as observers—enabled us to forecast the future.

In the 1980s policy studies as a field moved away from this instrumental logic and the positivist tradition. More emphasis is placed on policy studies based on symbolic interactionism and on the notion that human beings construct their own meanings and social reality. From this interpretationist perspective the policy analyst/scientist tasks change. For example, as Bosin and Mathews (1988) point out, the very notion of effectiveness alters, making instrumental logic less useful. If we must first understand the socially constructed meanings underlying our goals and analytic entities, we must first coordinate different levels of the enactment of meaning. We can no longer directly explore the most effective program strategy toward a goal. Analysts need to view units of analysis from a more process-oriented rather than product-oriented perspective.

To some extent program evaluation has already moved in this direction. Trends such as Stakeholder Evaluations and User-Focused Evaluation highlight obtaining consensus on the meaning of goals and program elements, recognizing that traditional summative-type program evaluation is not too useful—and often not valid.

Similarly predicting and forecasting become different when we move away from positivism to post-positivism and post-modern thought. In the past we thought we could improve decisionmaking by reducing chance. But the new systems of thought—and indeed even the science of physics—challenge this assumption. The new systems of thought do not try to reduce chance so much as to understand the interdependency between chance and certainty. Inquiry becomes a means by which to make difference—the anolalous, the unexpected event—understood. The idea is to locate uniqueness within a context and learn its continuity with nature. And, as Trudi Miller (1984) asserts to use research to create new programs and policies for the future. Design science replaces positive experimental science.

The goal of inquiry, contrary to traditional epistemological thinking, is not to make difference disappear within sameness (as in using a grand mean in statistics—or assimilating women and minorities to an upper-middle class male model of behavior), or to attempt to subsume the chance event under the law of the expected outcome, but to render differences understandable, articulable on their own terms. Chance events, anomalous events, have meanings of their own, not reducible to the meaning of the certain. Exceptions do not prove or refute laws of nature; they are significant in their own right, and in relation to laws of nature. Difference as difference may teach us some things.

These changes in inquiry are not unique to the social sciences. Ilya Prigogine, winner of the Nobel prize in physics in 1977, has concluded that "Twentieth century physics is no longer the knowledge of certainties, it is one of interrogation....And everywhere, instead of uncovering the permanence and immutability that classical science has taught us to seek out in nature, we have encountered change, instability, and evolution." (A New Model of Time, p. 304). There is no longer an assumption of symmetry between past and future. We need to account for the dynamics of interaction in the physical world as well as in the social world.

The most profound change in physics, according to Prigogine (p. 310) — and I would assert also in the social sciences—is

that of the end of the traditional priority given by physics to units as opposed to their interactions. This priority was far-reaching. Thus, systems with precisely calculable trajectories (the model of classical dynamics) are typified by the fact that there is a mathematical way to describe them by 'eliminating' their interactions. Units corresponding to the description behave as if each were isolated. Conversely, we owe the emergence of coherent collective behaviors to interactions between chemical molecules—implying billions of billions of molecules."

....as soon as there is a question of animal or human societies, or of interactions between living populations and their environment, it is still the interactions that count....Thus it can be thought that for these cases the conclusion we come to in chemistry prevails here as well. That is, . . . the search for a general law by which a behavior can be deducted deterministically is a poor model of intelligibility for such systems." p. 311

Conclusion

The search for a policy science of democracy has been derailed. Most policy researchers ignore the concern. Those that retain an explicit interest in the topic tend to focus on increasing citizen participation in policy dialogues. But the problems of our times require both a broader philosophical focus and a return to the essential questions of the the earlier policy science of democracy movement. In the coming decade policy studies will need to restructure the logic of its inquiry. The continuing utility of specific methods and analytic techniques needs to be explored, as does their relationship to the well- or ill-being of particular types of political regimes.

In this coming decade and in the 21st century policy studies as well as the social sciences in general will need to clarify its epistemology and methodologies once again. Determinism, instrumentalism, and "rational man" models no longer remain at the center of our inquiry. We need to explore whether we can develop models of reality that can retain elements of our old positivistic social science and still incorporate the importance of interaction and socially constructed meanings. We need to ascertain also how these new models of reality facilitate or impede the development and maintenance of a policy science of democracy and of democracy itself. It is useful to remember that particular political regimes are themselves not constant. Liberal democracy was created only in the 18th century; totalitarianism and communist regimes developed in the 20th. To pursue policy studies as though our form of government is a constant is foolhardy, hardly rational. At least part of our task as policy scientists is to inquire what is the best form of regime possible for this historical era, for the 21st century. Lasswell said the aim of knowledge was the wholesale reconstruction of society. Simple tinkering at the margins was not his goal. Policy studies as a field—and the future of democracy in general—would be better off, in my opinion, if more attention were paid to these broader goals and ideas. Much work clearly needs to be done.

Endnotes

1. In an effort to be systematic about examining the trends in the history of the notion of a policy science of democracy I reviewed all issues from 1979 to 1989 of four major political science journals—the American Political Science Review, Western Political Quarterly, the American Journal of Political Science, and Polity. (The Journal of Politics has not been forgotten, I just haven't gotten to it yet!). I also reviewed all issues of the Policy Studies Review, the Policy Studies Journal, and relevant books from the 1950s on.

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